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Abstract
Standard antitrust optimal fines rely on a microeconomic static model.
[9] describes optimal antitrust dynamic sanctions and its application for
EU and US methodology. For the EU fine, and based on this methodology,
we find an equilibrium point for a high level of offence (2 times normal
profits ) and a high detection probability (0.6).
1 Introduction
An economic explanation of deterrent fines was first studied by G. Becker [2].
Although there is an extensive literature on the topic, the vast mayority is
based on a short term static model , see [1, 3, 7, 6]. Examples of optimal
fine determination on a dynamic framework are [9, 8, 4, 5]. We follow [9] who
studied optimal dynamic fines and its application for the EU and US case.
The dynamic model provides a better framework for studying optimal fines, as
parameters such as detection probabilities are better explained in a dynamic
environment.
2 Optimal Fine : Static model
In the below graph for a static model [9] we see that a company searches for
positive illicit gains (PS) above normal profits using anticompetitive conduct.
The competition agency wants illicit gains to be 0 accepting only profits above
c that are due to competitive conduct.
Competition authorities can detect infringements and sanction companies im-
posing fines s(t), during the infringement duration t. I study the interactions
between companies and antitrust agency during T.
Companies maximize total profit and decide to collude, fixing prices above com-
petitive prices. The level of gravity of the infringement is represented as the
amount of overcharge q(t).
Competition agency objective is to maximize consumer welfare by preventing
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Figure 1: Producer and Consumer surplus in partial equilibrium
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and dismantling cartels at the lowest budgetary cost. Its activities are summa-
rized in the detection probability parameter p(t). I consider the companies profit
for colluding above imperfect competitive profit φ(t) > 0. Profits in competition
are above 0 and equal to a parameter m, φc = m.
3 Optimal Fine: Dynamic model
As in [9], I assume that the company is player 1 and the competition agency
is player 2. The detection of cartels are governed by a recursive process that
depends on gravity of infringement (collusion degree which is the control variable
of the company) q(t), and the detection capacity of the agency is p(t) so that :
˙F (t) = p(t)q(t)[1− F (t)].
In this case φ(t) is the probability conditional to being discovered in a time t if
never being discovered previously.
There is a state variable F (t) (probability distribution function of time until
detection), and two controls q(t) (firms degree of collusion ) and p(t) (agencys
capacity enforcement). Competition agency maximizes the following objective
function:
max
∫ T
0
e−rt[CS(q(t)) | +C(p(t))[1− F (t)] + s(q(t), p(t))F (t)]dt
−e−rtC1(T )[1− F (T )].
(1)
C(p(t)) is the cost function for the antitrust authority to carry on downraids
(salaries, number of downraids, etc.). We use a quadratic costs of law enforce-
ment due to price increase of the firm:C(p) = Np2. The term W (q(t)) is the
welfare loss due to the firms price increase. W (q(t)) increases when q increases.
s(t) ˙F (t) reflects the expected fine which is detected in t. The fine s(t) represents
the fine at t. The higher the degree of collusion is q(t), the higher the detection
probability and the higher the expected fine would be. C1(T ) is the terminal
loss of the authority if the colluding firm was not yet caught by time T .
A firm maximizes the following objective function:
max
∫ T
0
e−rt[PS(q(t))[1− F (t)] + PScompF (t)− s(q(t), p(t))F (t)]dt
+e−rtC2(T )[1− F (T )].
(2)
The term PS(q(t) is the illicit profit of the firm, and −s(q(t), p(t))F (t) is the
punishment received by the infringing company in t, the fine multiplied by the
detection probability: s(q(t), p(t)) that depends of both control variables.
PScompF (t) reflects the profit of the firm after cartel discovery, once the cartel
is expected to be dismantled, so that PScomp is above 0. C2(T ) is the final
profit of the firm if the infringing firm is not detected by the time T .
Using a linear fine that increases with gravity of infringement q:
s(q) = KΠmq. (3)
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where K is a positive constant, which is the steepness of the penalty scheme
and Pim are illicit profits. If we use the linear penalty together with parameter
values of Πm = 1, N = 2,K = 0.5 we obtain the following equations for the
control variables:
dq =
1
2
q2
q2 − q3 − 4p2 + 8qp2 + 2p3q
2p2q + 0.5q2 − 0.5q3 + 4p
dp =
1
2
q2p
0.25q2p2 + 8p2 + 4p3 − q2
2p2q + 0.5q2 − 0.5q3 + 4p
(4)
We obtain the following phase graph were OA is the line where dp=0 and OB
where dq=0. There is no saddle point in the [0,1] limits of p and q but there
is an equilibrium for higher levels of mark-ups and deterrence policies. In fact,
the intersection of both lines shows an equilibrium point at p = 0.652573, q =
2.36912, which is out of the bounds for the q control variable.
4 Conclusion
In this note I describe a numerical solution to a dynamic optimal fines. I also
show that phase diagrams can be an easy way to describe complex dynamic
game solutions. In this case the equilibrium reached is not possible because the
control variable of the firm q is out of normal bounds which is between 0 and 1.
Besides it could be interesting to research on new possible numerical solutions
and alternative equations for antitrust authority and firms.
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